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The Aral Sea and the whole Aral SeaBasin has achieved worldwidenotoriety as one of the major human-
induced environmental degradation of the
20th century. The International Geographi-
cal Union singled out the Aral basin in the
early 1990s as one of the earth’s critical
zones [Kasperson 1995]. It is also often
referred to as a ‘Quiet Chernobyl’, a silent
catastrophe that has evolved slowly, al-
most imperceptibly, over the past few
decades [Glantz and Zonn 1991]. The
shrinking of the Aral Sea has in recent
years captured the attention and interest
of governments, environment and deve-
lopment organisations, the lay public, and
the media around the globe [Ellis 1990].
From the mid-1980s, when the former
Soviet (FSU) opened its doors under the
policy of glasnost (openness), the Aral Sea
situation took on the aura of an environ-
mental calamity to many foreign observ-
ers [Glantz 1998]. Since then scientists
have spoken out more strongly for saving
the Aral Sea. Unfortunately by that time
the Aral Sea had shrunk to a third of its
former size. Although it was newly ex-
posed to the international media, and
discussed with a new openness in the
Soviet Union, it was a known crisis situ-
ation that was on the agenda of the policy-
makers in FSU for over 30 years.1
Aral Sea before 1960
The Aral Sea is situated approximately
600 km east of the Caspian Sea. There
used to be more than 1,100 islands sepa-
rated by lagoons and narrow straits,
which gave the sea its name: in Kazakh,
‘Aral’ means ‘island’. At present the Kok
Aral, the largest among the islands (now
of smaller lakes and biologically rich
marshes and wetlands. Tight forests of
reed and rush, sometimes stretching sev-
eral kilometres into the sea encircled the
shores bordering the sea. Around the sea
and in the river delta, big populations of
Saika (an antelope), wild boar, wolf, fox,
muskrat, turkey, goose and duck were
found.
The Aral Sea was like a big oasis in the
desert. For many centuries the steppe and
semi-desert areas around the Aral Sea have
been home for various ethnic groups. Prior
to the arrival of imperial Russia, the
population living in the region of the Aral
Sea was predominantly nomadic. This way
of life was to an extent essential given the
conditions of the desert environment. The
climate is strongly continental and the
landscape is a typical semi-desert. Annual
precipitation is about 200 mm. Agricul-
ture is impossible with this amount of
rainfall. Only in the area close to the two
rivers agriculture was possible, so people
living away from the river banks lived
solely by raising animals. The first task
of the imperial Russian government was
to settle the population into agricultural
communities. It was found that the land
was good for agriculture if water was
made available. At the end of the 19th
century, cotton was cultivated on a rela-
tively large scale when new irrigation
technologies were introduced. Canals were
dug to facilitate irrigation and sizeable
portion of central Asia’s agricultural pro-
duction was completely dependent on
irrigation.
In the years after the Bolshevik Revo-
lution interest in irrigating the central Asian
territories grew. The irrigated area was
extensively developed beginning in the
1920s as the Soviets of the times (Bolshe-
viks) were eager to increase cotton pro-
duction. In 1918 Lenin issued a procla-
mation about more cotton from
‘Turkestan’. Besides this they also wanted
to get control of the rural population. In
the late 1930s, under Stalin’s command
the Soviet water ministry began a massive
project of water diversion for the purpose
of irrigating the steppes in Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan to prepare
them for cotton farming. The first major
irrigation project came into operation in
1939 with the construction of the canal
surrounding the Ferghana Valley in
Uzbekistan. Towards the end of the 1940s,
large amounts of water from the Syrdarya
River were diverted to Kizil-Orda in
Kazakhstan and to the area near Tashkent
in Uzbekistan for agricultural purposes
[Altan 1995]. Agricultural production
peninsula) scattered over the Aral Sea
separates the north-eastern part which is
called the Small Aral from the south-
western part, the Big Aral. This forms the
natural borderline between Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan that share the sea. The two
parts are connected by the Berg strait. The
Aral Sea till 1960 was the fourth largest
lake in the world, covering 66,000 square
km, with a total volume estimated at more
than 1,000 cubic km [Kabori and Glantz
1998]. Although it is called a sea, in reality
it is a terminal lake fed by two major rivers,
the Syrdarya in the north and Amudarya
in the south. The Amudarya, the largest
river in the area, starts from the Kunlun
mountains in the Hindu Kush range runs
north-west through the Pamir Heights, and
then flows through Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan (forming border with
Afganistan), Turkmenistan, once again
through Uzbekistan before entering the
Aral Sea. The Syrdarya commencing from
the northern base of the Tien Shan moun-
tains in Kyrgyzstan, flows through
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and
then into the Aral Sea [Islamov 1998].
Therefore, though the Aral Sea itself
l ies between Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan, all five states of central Asia
share the Aral Sea basin, an area of 6,90,000
square km.2 The stream flows of these two
perennial river systems, sustained a stable
Aral Sea level. Over the centuries, about
half of the flow of the two rivers reached
the Aral Sea.
A vast delta sustained a prolific fishery.3
In the sea, a variety of species of fish were
found and caught, including species that
only existed in the Aral Sea, and among
those the famous Aral sturgeon. Its waters
supplied local fisheries with annual catches
of more than 40,000 tonnes, while the
deltas of its major tributaries hosted dozens
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along the Syrdarya was prepared and
initiated, with tragic consequences to the
Kazakh nomadic culture. The Stalin
collectivisation programme struck the
Kazakhs harshly, and it is estimated that
more than one million Kazakhs died or fled
the area and moved to the countries south
of Kazakhstan. The Kazakhs, who remained,
did not have the required knowledge and
tradition in agriculture, which is why
experts had to be brought from outside.4
As the peasants of central Asia did not take
well to collectivisation and industrialisation
of agriculture, cotton production in
Uzbekistan and wheat/rice in Kazakhstan
did not increase until around the early
1940s – after a million or so farmers and
peasants were killed [Hav 1998].
Following Stalin’s death in 1953, his
successors Nikita Khrushchev and, later,
Leonid Brezhnev continued the same Soviet
policy in central Asia, converting even
more arable lands to the production of
cotton. Several large-scale canals were
completed between the late 1950s and
1970 to serve these expansions of the cotton
monoculture: the five-hundred-mile Qara-
Qum Canal from the Amudarya to
Ashkhabad, the Mirzachol Sahra irriga-
tion network, the Chu Canal in Kyrgyzstan,
and the Bahr-i Tajik Reservoir serving
Tajikistan [Blake 2002]. Beginning in the
late 1950s Moscow instituted a regime of
cotton monoculture, whereby the entire
way of life became focused on the produc-
tion of cotton, with few benefits incurred
by the population and the indigenous
cultural ways were destroyed. Nikita
Khrushchev (1953-1964) was personally
fascinated by an agriculture that required
no humus, and which could be conducted
directly on sandy soil, using only vast
supplies of water. Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan both covered vast areas of sandy
soil, and through both republics ran these
two rivers with immense amounts of water.
A programme was launched to make the
USSR self-sufficient in wheat and cotton.
Cotton needs a warm climate, which is
why the cotton production was placed in
Uzbekistan, irrigated by the waters of the
Amudarya. Production of wheat, barley,
millet and rice was mainly placed along
the Syrdarya and its irrigation system in
Kazakstan.
The Aral Sea drainage basin, soon be-
came a very important basin for Soviet
agriculture. For millennia, people have suc-
cessfully converted desert landscapes into
agricultural land through irrigation. Al-
though irrigated agriculture in the Aral Sea
basin started with the Tsarist conquests of
the 18th and 19th centuries, irrigation
during the Soviet regime was different
because huge amounts of water was di-
verted from the region’s two major rivers.
Upstream irrigation schemes, for the grow-
ing of rice and cotton, consumed, like a
sponge, more than 90 per cent of the natural
flow of water from these rivers. So much
so, beginning in the late 1970s, no water
from the Syrdarya reached the Aral Sea
and the Amudarya supplied only a minimal
and ever-decreasing volume [Bedford
1996]. Added to this because of high
evaporation, these lands became salinised.
In order to flush out those salts from the
soil, drainage channels were constructed,
but these were quite inadequate. Large
diversions, poor irrigation construction and
maintenance, and mismanagement of water
resources have been identified as major
causes for the decreased flow to the Aral
Sea which in turn altered the existing
ecological balance.
Demise of Aral Sea
It is publicly accepted that this tragic
demise of the Aral Sea began in 1960. That
was the year planners in Moscow inaugu-
rated the Aral Sea Project, the ambitious
economic programme to convert vital
wasteland into the cotton belt of the Soviet
Union. The planners assigned central Asia
the role of supplier of raw materials, notably
cotton. This led to a substantial reduction
in the sowing of traditional crops such as
alfalfa and plants grown for vegetable oil.
Orchards and mulberry groves were up-
rooted to pave the way for more cotton.
The desire to expand cotton production
onto desert land increased the dependence
of central Asia, particularly Uzbekistan on
irrigation.
The Aral Sea and its tributaries seemed
a limitless source of water. Extensive canals
were dug to spread the water of the
Amudarya and Syrdarya across the desert
floor. Irrigated area doubled in less than
a decade to 17 million acres, half of this
land produced cotton and other half rice,
wheat, corn, fruits, vegetables, and forage
for livestock. It goes without saying that
irrigation agriculture was not planned for
the purpose of destroying nature. Creating
an enormous income from irrigated agricul-
ture was a brilliant success. By Moscow’s
account, the early years of the project were
an accomplishment. Production quotas for
cotton and other commodities were met or
exceeded year in and year out. The Aral
Sea basin became the country’s leading
supplier of fresh produce. Incomes in the
five republics of Central Asia that share
the basin – Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan
along the shores of the Aral Sea, and
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan
to the south in the watersheds of the
Amudarya and Syrdarya rivers – climbed
steadily. From 1940 to 1980, Soviet cotton
output rose from 2.24 to 9.1 million tonnes.
Most of this cotton came from Uzbekistan,
Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, which to-
gether accounted for nearly 90 per cent of
the entire Soviet crop [Critchlow 1991].
The trouble began because the contrac-
tion of the Aral Sea and some other con-
sequences brought by irrigation had been
treated as trifling matters by the authorities
until the 1970s. It is not the project as such
but the ill-conceived and badly managed
farming methods that have devastated the
economy, health and ecology of the Aral
Sea basin affecting millions of people.
Numerous canals were dug and the build-
ing of dams across the river was also done
in haste. By 1978, a vast network of ir-
rigation channels stretched into the deserts
to quench cotton’s thirst across 7.7 million
hectares, mainly in Uzbekistan. The main
and seondary canals were dug in the sand
and no pipes set in place or cementing was
resorted to. Draining the fields was not
given any importance either. In the season,
floodgates were closed, and the water was
led directly into the fields, a system that
caused a tremendous loss of water. Less
than 10 per cent of the water taken in was
directly beneficial to the crop. The rest
disappeared down the sandy soil or evapo-
rated. It was these large inefficient and
ineffective programmes that were adopted
to meet the huge demand for water that
ultimately resulted in the drying up of the
Aral Sea. The resultant drop in the level
of the Aral Sea was supposed to be made
good by ambitious projects for diverting
the waters of rivers in northern Russia.
Those projects never got off the ground,
and the Sea continued to dry out, year
after year. The result was catastrophic
and the irrigation that made the desert
bloom and incomes rise set in motion a
disastrous chain of events first detected in
falling water levels and declining fish
catches.
Unfortunately, therefore, just 20 years
the fourth largest inland sea on earth
turned into a dry, contaminated, toxic salt
plain. The ecological crisis in the Aral Sea
area now covers the once very fertile au-
tonomous republic of Karakalpakstan in
Uzbekistan, Tashauz Velayat in Northern
Turkmenistan and Kzyl Orda Oblast in
western Kazakhstan. This entire region
fell prey to one of the worst environmental
disasters. Before 1960, 55 billion cubic
metres of water flowed into the Aral Sea,
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maintaining it at a healthy level. During
the 1980s, the average flow into the sea
was only 7 billion cubic metres. Recently,
only 1 to 5 billion cubic metres have reached
the sea annually. Seventy-five per cent of
the lake’s volume has been lost since 1960,
and there are strong fears that it may dry
up completely by 2015. In the past, the
Aral Sea fluctuated in response to world-
wide climate, typically rising when gla-
ciers melted and falling when glaciers
formed. Under natural conditions the Aral
Sea would be rising now – the nearby
Caspian Sea has risen two metres since
1977 due to increased rainfall and de-
creased evaporation.
Environmental Degradation
It has been publicly acknowledged that
the environmental degradation in the Aral
Sea basin is the outcome of the Soviet
tribute to King Cotton. The luxury use of
the water resources of the rivers has led
to a severe loss of the equilibrium between
the natural water sources in ecosystems
and the water use in agricultural irrigation.
Water diversions from the two main re-
gional rivers robbed the sea and deltas of
annual freshwater replenishment. The river
water is saline below 0.7 per mille, while
the water in the Aral Sea was brackish with
salinity at approximately 9 per mille. The
salt in the Aral Sea was caused partly by
the vast evaporation, and partly by the fact
that the ground water in and around the
Aral Sea is salted.5 The salinity was con-
trolled because of the vast supply of fresh
water from the two rivers Syrdarya and
Amudarya. The summer heat caused (and
stills causes) a vast evaporation and the
evaporation was the reason for the good
climate around Aral before the drying out
of the sea. As the water was diverted from
the rivers, which feed the Aral Sea,
salinisation became widespread.
Environmental problems created by the
drying up of the Aral Sea besides
salinisation of the soil, include increased
salinity of sea water, wind erosion, salt-
laden dust storms, destroyed fish spawn-
ing grounds, the collapse of the fishing
industry, waterlogging, disruption of navi-
gation, the division of the sea into separate
parts, the loss of wildlife in the littoral
areas, the large reduction of streamflow
from the two main tributaries, the need for
extra-basin water resources to stabilise the
sea level, a change in the regional climate,
the disappearance of pasturelands, and so
forth. All these grave environmental prob-
lems are affecting the region’s economy;
a situation compounded by high popula-
tion growth rates. By the beginning of the
20th century, 8 millions of people lived
there. Since then the population of the
region has increased to 50 million people
and the irrigated land has grown to 7.7
million hectares. Discussed below are some
of the major issues.
(a) Desertification: As described above,
the huge irrigation projects in central Asia
during Soviet times are blamed for the
catastrophic desiccation of the Aral Sea.
As the Aral Sea level dropped from 53
metres above sea level to 36 metres, its
surface area shrunk by half and its volume
by three-quarters. Salt concentration
doubled. As a result, in addition to the drop
in water levels, the large amount of irri-
gated lands in time began to reduce pro-
ductivity because of salinisation. This
phenomenon is called the Aral Sea deser-
tification. Most parts of the dry sea floor
are covered with deposits of billions of
tonnes of toxic salts, brought there over
the decades with the water seeping from
the fields into the rivers. The area of the
dry sea floor, locally known as the Aralkum
desert, is now about 40,300 square
kilometres. During the Soviet regime, large
areas in this region were used as military
and space centers and so the problem is
aggravated as the salt is polluted with
chemicals. The wind blowing from the sea,
catch the salt polluted with chemicals from
the exposed seabed and carry it to crop
fields at an estimated rate of 75 million
tonnes a year moving in belts as broad as
40 km, damaging soil thousands of km
away [Sinnot 1992]. Such salts can destroy
the cotton crops at the very beginning of
their vegetation period. To move the salt
away from the soil it is necessary to con-
tinually water the land for a long period
of time. This requires even more fresh
water to be supplied which means more
diversions of the river waters and so this
formed some sort of vicious circle. And
thus desert and sandy areas are being
extended by the impact of wind, and there-
fore further desertification is taking place.
The Uzbek Academy of Sciences says that
new desert to the south and east of the Aral
Sea has already expanded to 5 million
hectares. This is often ironically referred
to as a ‘white desert’ because the toxic salt
pans encrust its surface after merging with
the Karakum (black desert) and Kyzylkum
(red desert), that surround the Aral Sea.
The vast wasteland of glaring white sand
that blows into agricultural fields contami-
nates the earth and forces farmers to
compensate for declining output by put-
ting more pesticides and fertilisers into the
soil – poisoning it even more.
Soil exhaustion and salinisation were
exacerbated by the massive use of fertilisers
and pesticides [Kekacewicz 2000]. The
discharge of salt besides decreasing the
agriculturally useable area is destroying
pastures and creating a consequent short-
age of forage for domestic animals. The
pasture productivity has decreased by a
half, and meadow vegetation destruction
has decreased meadow productivity 10
times.
(b) Destruction of fish populations in the
Aral Sea: Before 1960 fishing was a thriv-
ing business. A once-thriving fishing in-
dustry had become adversely affected by
increasing amounts of pollutants entering
the Aral Sea by way of the rivers, in addition
to the fact that in the last 30 years, more
than 60 per cent of the lake has disap-
peared. Consequently, concentrations of
salts and minerals began to rise in the
shrinking body of water. The salinity of
Aral Sea water increased to such an extent
that several areas had the same salinity as
the open ocean. This change in chemistry
led to staggering alterations in the lake’s
ecology, causing precipitous drops in the
Aral Sea’s fish population. The mineral
content of the water has increased fourfold
to 40 g/litre, preventing the survival of
most of the sea’s fish and wild life. Fish
have all but disappeared from what re-
mains of the lake, leaving thousands of
people without a livelihood. As the Aral
began to shrink rapidly fishing boats and
their communities were left high and dry,
sometimes tens of kilometres from the old
shoreline.6 All commercial fishing ended
in 1982, current fish hauls are negligible,
and entire fishing communities are now
unemployed. The loss of fish productivity
sparked a collapse of the industry and
employment in this sector. In 1960, 43,430
metric tonnes of fish were caught in the
Sea, dropping to 17,400 tonnes in 1970,
to zero tonnes in 1980, and remaining there
until now [Letolle and Mainguet 1993].
Two important ports, Aralsk and Moynaq
flourished as fishing centres. The port of
Aralsk, situated in the northern part of the
Small Aral in Kazakhstan was a well
functioning town with a shipbuilding yard,
fishing industry and ferry service. In the
shipyard, ships of 50-500 tonnes were built
for cargo and fishery on the Aral Sea. The
Aralsk railway station, situated on the track
from Moscow to Tashkent and Almaty,
was the most important railway connec-
tion in central Asia. Cargo from the rail-
way used to be trans-shipped to cargo
boats and shipped off southwards to the
port of Moynaq in Karakalpakstan,
Uzbekistan.7 In 1975, fishing stopped in
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the Small Aral, and Aralsk was a port
without a port. The ferry service stopped,
the ground water salinity increased, hunt-
ing went down, and the climate started
undergoing changes, among other reasons
because the big forests of reed and rush
disappeared, when the water drew back.
In order to maintain the employment in
fishing industry, frozen fish was intro-
duced from other parts of the USSR, such
as the Baltic Sea, the White Sea, and the
Pacific Ocean. This supply stopped with
the disintegration of the FSU.
Moynaq situated on the southern shores
of the Aral, besides being a center for
fishing industry, was once a very popular
spa town. It is impossible to imagine a time
when this town was a thriving vacation
resort. Soviet tourists once flocked to
Moynaq to swim in the Aral Sea’s waters,
famed for healing skin diseases, and to
sunbathe on pristine beaches. Children from
far away cities came here for summer camps
to breathe the sea air and eat fresh fish.
Today Moynaq overlooks a glistening salty
plain, now a graveyard of rusting hulks of
stranded fishing vessels. The sea is miles
away from the promenade and impossible
to see with the naked eye.
It is not as though this situation was a
bolt from the blue. From the 1970s this
subject was widely discussed in govern-
ment circles. At a 1977 Soviet conference
on the environmental impact of a drop in
the level of the Aral Sea, a paper prepared
by two Uzbek republic scientists reported
a sharp reduction in fish landings
[Gorodetskaya and Kes 1978]. Others also
at that time suggested that a demise of the
commercial fishery would likely occur
because of the desiccation of the sea’s fish
spawning grounds [Barovsky 1980]. The
same forum also suggested that the deple-
tion of the Aral Sea fisheries would be one
of the first consequences of declining sea
levels. There was a report in a journal by
A U Reteyum wherein he pointed out, “in
1965, the Council of Ministers of the USSR
passed a special resolution, ‘On Measures
to Preserve the Fishery -Importance of the
Aral Sea.’ ” This is an example to support
the belief, that signs of deterioration in the
Aral basin were visible as early as the mid-
1960s [Reteyum 1991]. By the late 1970s,
it was quite clear that the Aral Sea fisheries
were in an irreversible decline and prob-
ably if proper precautions were taken in
time the present situation could have been
avoided.
(c) Climatic Changes: During the last 5-
10 years the drying off of the Aral Sea,
brought about noticeable changes in cli-
mate conditions. The sea’s warming effect
in winter and its cooling effect in summer
decreased dramatically. The Aral Sea is a
desert lake situated in a strong continental
climate, with a variation of temperature
from 40 degrees centigrade plus in the
summer time to 30 degrees below zero in
the winter. In the past the Aral Sea was
considered a regulator mitigating cold
winds that soared out of Siberia in winter
while keeping summertime temperatures
from growing too hot. High evaporation
(up to 1700 mm per year) is marked. The
evaporation too was the reason for the
good climate around Aral before the
drying out of the sea, and in spite of a high
level of evaporation the water balance was
maintained because of the vast supply of
water from the two rivers. Climate changes
have led to a dryer and shorter summer in
the region, and longer and colder winters.
Air temperature during winters has fallen,
and summer temperatures have increased
by 2-3 degrees C, including observations
of 49 degrees C. This change to a more
continental climate, with shorter, hotter
summers and longer, colder winters
deliver little precipitation for the next
harvest. On the shores of the Aral Sea
precipitation was reduced several times.
Average precipitation magnitude is 150-
200 mm with considerable seasonal non-
uniformity. The growing season has also
declined to 170 days, missing the 200
frost-free days needed to harvest cotton.
As explained earlier frequent occurrence
of long dust storms and ground winds is
characteristic feature of the region. They
are the most intensive on the western coast
– with perhaps more than 50 days of storms
per year. Maximum wind velocity reaches
20-25 m/s.
(d) Health Conditions: The region’s health
crisis is believed to be directly linked to
the disappearance of the Aral Sea. Making
matters even worse, people also have little
access to drinking water. Chemical runoff
from the farm fields has polluted the Aral
Sea even more, making it unsafe for con-
sumption by both humans and livestock.
Cotton is a demanding master. Not only
is it thirstier than most other commercial
crops, it requires heavy applications of
pesticides to keep boll weevils and other
pests at bay. In the Soviet mind, the theory
often seems to be “if a little is good, a lot
is better”, – a lot of water, a lot of
pesticides. In addition, the cotton crop is
routinely sprayed with a defoliant each fall
to get rid of the leaves to make harvesting
easier. Since the basin is a closed system
that has no drainage to the outside, the
insecticides and herbicides sprayed on the
fields percolate downward, accumulating
in the underground water supply at dan-
gerous levels. As most tap water comes
from wells, the people drink a cocktail of
diluted chemicals, some of which are
known carcinogens. High levels of pesti-
cide contamination are alleged to affect the
human body’s ability to absorb iron, caus-
ing anemia. The drinking water contains
upward of six grams of salt per liter, a level
four times higher than the World Health
Organisation standard. This has been re-
lated to the prevalence of kidney disease.
Dust storms rage for up to 60 days a year,
spreading toxic residue and salt left behind
by the sea. These particles are thought to
be a possible cause of respiratory diseases
and cancers. (When the sea eventually
dries up, an estimated 15 billion tonnes of
salt will be released into the atmosphere.)
According to Timothy Cummings, an
American Red Cross delegate working in
the Aral Sea region the combination of
toxins from the air and drinking water has
added to the poor health of residents –
already susceptible to disease because of
malnutrition.8
The USSR Environmental Report, a
government publication, pointed out that
the total pesticide load in Turkmenistan
was 20 to 25 times the national average.
“In high pesticide use areas the total infant
morbidity (disease rate) through age six is
4.6 times higher than in low pesticide
regions” [Jones 1999]. According to the
Soviet Academy of Sciences, child morta-
lity rates in the central Asian region in-
creased between 1970 and 1985. In the
Bozataus region of Karakalpakstan, an area
simultaneously plagued with a lack of
sewage treatment facilities, inadequate
maternal and child health care, and rising
levels of pesticides and herbicides in drink-
ing water, 110 of every 1,000 infants die
before their first birthday. This compares
with 109 in Africa, 95 in India, and 37 in
China. For example, in Karakalpakstan,
the esophageal cancer rate is seven times
higher than in the rest of the country. One
Soviet researcher, E Paronina, studied
health conditions in Karakalpakstan and
reported her dismal findings. Summing
up, she says, “All of this (health crisis) is
the inordinate price paid with the health
of the population for self-sufficiency in
cotton” [Jones 1991]. Not surprisingly, the
local medical literature is filled with
stories of birth deformities, increased liver
and kidney disease, chronic gastritis,
rising infant mortality, and soaring cancer
rates.
People have also had to adapt to a drastic
change in climate. As already observed
over the last four decades, summers have
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become hotter and shorter, and winters
cooler. “A climate change doesn’t neces-
sarily affect the spread of disease, but it
makes life a lot more difficult,” said Darin
Portnoy, a Western TB specialist working
for a World Bank Project in Moynaq.
“People are staying inside for longer periods
of time. They’re in enclosed conditions
where they spread disease to others.”9
Just as it seemed to appear as if matters
could not get more depressing there was
another nerve-racking revelation. It was
brought to light that barrels of the anthrax
bacteria had been buried on Vozrozhdeniye
Island, situated in the Aral Sea, when
Uzbekistan was part of the USSR. During
Mikhail Gorbachev’s rule, Washington’s
intelligence team revealed that the Soviet
Union, contrary to its treaty pledges, was
producing chemical weapons. In 1988, the
US demanded the inspection of Soviet
chemical facilities. It is believed, scientists
in the Siberian city of Sverdlovsk were
ordered to transfer hundreds of tonnes of
anthrax into giant stainless-steel canisters
and pour bleach into them to kill the
bacteria. The deadly cargo was then trans-
ported to the Aral Sea island which had
been the Soviet Union’s open-air testing
site for biological weapons. However, the
bleach failed to destroy the anthrax
bacteria completely. Tests on soil samples
show that some of the spores are still alive.
The fear is that the buried anthrax bacteria
could be transported to Uzbek and Kazakh
territory by lizards and birds. Anthrax,
characterised by lesions in the lungs and
external ulcers, is transmitted from
animals to humans though contact. Both
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have asked
the US for help in assessing the site’s
danger, since Russia has not delivered on
Boris Yeltsin’s 1992 pledge to close and
decontaminate the site [Jones 1999].
Regional Water Strategy
As early as the 1982, the government
sought to develop a water resources master
plan for the Syrdarya and Amudarya river
basins and placed strict limits on water
withdrawal. Soon after, two organisations
were created to operate and maintain the
main hydraulic infrastructures and to
monitor water use. There were many pro-
posals to transfer of water to the Aral from
the Caspian Sea.10 One long-standing
scheme was to divert the waters of such
Siberian rivers as the Ob, Irtysh, and
Yenisey and to channel them southward
to the Aral Sea region and to the desert.
This plan has been canceled after years of
controversy about its cost and environ-
mental consequences, but some local sci-
entists are still hanging on to the idea.
Another suggestion was to break up the
glaciers of the Pamir and Tien Shan
mountains with nuclear explosions. These
ideas are not realistic, especially at a time
of economic crisis. However, such ideas
still survive.
With the end of the Soviet period, the
five independent Central Asian Republics
(CAR) established a joint commission for
water coordination to regulate water dis-
tribution in the basin and consolidate
country positions for the adoption of a
regional water strategy. In 1992, the World
Bank was asked to coordinate interna-
tional aid in response to the crisis in the
Aral Sea basin. In September 1992, a World
Bank team visited the region and prepared
a report on its findings. An international
conference sponsored by the World Bank,
the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme (UNEP), and the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) was
held in Washington in April 1993 to dis-
cuss the Bank’s proposal. Representatives
of the five republics, as well as other in-
ternational organisations and donor agen-
cies attended this. Based on the World
Bank’s recommendations, a joint Bank-
UNEP-UNDP team visited the region in
May 1993 and prepared a programme for
donor financing in collaboration with the
CAR. This programme consisted of 19
projects for the first stage of a three-phase
programme to save the Aral Sea [Kirmani
and Moigne 1997]. The CAR in turn es-
tablished three regional organisations –
the Interstate Council, the International
Fund for Aral Sea, and the Executive
Committee – to implement the pro-
gramme.11 Greater use of agricultural
drainage water and waste water, as well
as the introduction of more salt-tolerant
crops, is envisaged and, in part, imple-
mented. About 6 cubic km/year of agri-
cultural drainage waters or waste water are
directly reused for irrigation, while some
37 cubic km/year return to natural depres-
sions or rivers where they are mixed with
fresh water and can be reused for irrigation
or other purposes. The best they hope for
is some sort of stabilisation of the sea and
the survival of the river’s two deltas. Saving
the deltas could lead to new commercial
fishing activity.
Government leaders have said that the
amount of land for cotton will be reduced
and large amounts of water will be pumped
back into the Aral Sea until the year 2005
[Bechm 1995]. Agricultural officials, how-
ever, say that it is impossible to demolish
the canal system. Too many farmers
depend on the income from cotton. The
government has also indicated that the
welfare of the cotton farmers must come
first. Exported cotton is a major source of
income. The CAR are unwilling to uproot
the cotton monoculture and risk the loss
of its economic rewards. And so most
scientists believe that the Aral Sea cannot
ever be as it was before.
The future of the Aral Sea is therefore
quite uncertain. Only thing that is certain
is that the Aral Sea is now an environmen-
tal catastrophe, as the water level is de-
clining and the ecosystem is being de-
graded, causing a deteriorating environ-
ment and declining living conditions and
health of the people living around its shores.
It is impossible now to forecast the future
for the Aral with any certainty but if no
major solutions are found, the sea level
will continue to decline. Whatever the
future holds this has certainly opened the
eyes of governments around the globe. It
is a stern warning to the international
community and illustrates how fast – in
less than 20 years – environmental and
humanitarian tragedy can threaten a whole
region and its population. The destruction
of the Aral Sea is a textbook example of
unsustainable development.
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